The European Union designation of the Kurdistan Workers' Party as an international terrorist organization has led to a profound distrust of the EU on the part of the PKK.
INTRODUCTION
As of 2002, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, the PKK) found itself designated an international terrorist organization. The international proscription of the PKK that came with its entry onto the EU, US and UK terrorist lists constituted the beginning of a new era for the main actor in Turkey's Kurdish nationalist movement. Having waged an insurgency war against the Turkish state since 1984, the PKK had long been branded 'terrorist' by the Turkish state, and the civil disruption and criminality associated with the organization and its affiliates in Europe had led Germany and France to order the closure of the organization's branches in their territories during the mid 1990s. Nevertheless, the classification of the PKK as an international terrorist organization in the wake of September 11 th was particularly hard to digest for the party and its followers -so much so that the Europe-based PKK-related organizations have devoted much of their time to divesting themselves of the 'terrorist' stigma and restoring the organization's legitimacy as a socialpolitical movement. To this end, legal and political activities as well as socio-political protest events have been staged in Europe. These activities attest to ongoing (albeit weakening) efforts of the Kurdish nationalist movement's main actor to capitalize on international support, in particular with regards to the EU member states and its institutions, which are in continuing negotiations with Turkey over its possible future accession.
This paper bears testimony to a deepening sense of distrust on the part of the PKK towards the EU institutions that had previously served it well, and attests to an ongoing struggle by the former for the creation of a political space that is inclusive of the organization deemed to represent Turkey's most politicized Kurds. Consequently, these findings reject the thesis of Uslu (2008) , that since late 2005 the PKK has sought to actively undermine the Turkey-EU accession negotiations. The findings reported here indicate that what has been happening is best understood not as a move by the PKK away from the EU, but as an ongoing attempt by the organization to be incorporated into the negotiations over Turkey's future, and thus the future of Turkey's Kurds, as well as a concern for its own survival, especially as the centre of gravity in Turkey's Kurdish activism moves from violent to peaceful means, participating in rather than excluded from the country's political system. In other words, the PKK is not seeking to actively undermine Turkey's accession to the European Union, but has turned its own political recognition into the condition for its support.
This paper begins with a brief introduction of Turkey's Kurdish question, focusing particularly on how the PKK and its political wing or allies have evolved since the start of its insurgency in 1984 up to the present. Then, special attention is drawn to PKK's installation and activities in Europe since the mid 1980s. This is to serve a better understanding of the effects of the listing for the PKK's operational space in Europe, as well as the current initiatives undertaken in the light of the terrorist designation. After elaborating on the consequences of the terrorist labelling and how it was received by PKK political activists and sympathizers, the paper explores the initiatives aimed at (re)gaining political legitimacy in the international political arena, upon which support for Turkey's accession to the European Union is made conditional. The value of the terrorist designation itself -moral, practical or otherwise -is not the main concern of this paper, it should be emphasized, but rather the impact of the designation on the PKK positioning in relation to the European Union.
BACKGROUND The Kurdish Question in Turkey and the armed conflict with the PKK
In the inter-war period when the Republic of Turkey arose from the remains of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) led a revolutionary reconstruction of the territory. This involved, among other things, a nationalist project of 'Turkification', and in mainly Kurdish provinces of the south-east of the country, a series of rebellions was crushed (McDowall, 1996; Taspinar, 2005; Jongerden 2007) . By the 1950s, Kurdish (and other) identities had been technically cleansed by the 'Kemalist' ideology (Kurds were re-designated as 'mountain Turks'). Various forms of martial law and direct rule from Ankara were applied, and further post-war periods of repression followed a succession of military coups (1960, '71, '80) . It took until the end of the 1960s for Kurdish dissidents to politically reorganize, and it was only in the mid 80s that Kurds took up arms again, with a fully-fledged insurgency instigated against the Turkish state.
Officially established in 1978, the PKK started its armed insurgency in 1984, which, although interrupted by ceasefires of varying durations, continues to this day. The PKK initially aimed at 'a destruction of colonialism' -referring to all the state-forces 'occupying' the Kurdish populated region of the north-western Middle East (i.e. including territory in Syria, Iraq and Iran, not just Turkey -and 'the construction of a democratic and united Kurdistan, based on Marxist-Leninist principles' . After the 1980 coup, which had led to the imprisonment and exile of almost all leftist and Kurdish nationalist party leaders and militants, the PKK leadership fled Turkey for Syria. This left the party one of the very few radical leftist or Kurdish organizations in or from Turkey that was still operational (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2010) . The PKK set about implementing a guerrilla war on Maoist principles, through which it was able to effectively takeover large tracts of the countryside in the southeast by the early 1990s. The Turkish military responded, however, and the tide was turned. By the beginning of the millennium the state had largely regained control of the situation, by a variety of legal and illegal methods. 2 The security situation today remains tense and unresolved, with a small but steady stream of deaths on both sides and unrest in cities.
After the capture of its leader and co-founder, Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, the PKK transformed itself ideologically and organizationally, upon Öcalan's guidelines passed through lawyers from his prison cell on the island of Imralli (Marcus, 2007a; Gunter 2008 ).
The PKK today no longer advocates separation from Turkey as official policy, but seeks the transformation of -and its integration into -a democratized, confederalized Turkey Coincidently, it was during the period around the international terrorist listing of the PKK, that the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) established itself, with representation at both the national and the local levels. The DTP was generally seen as the political wing of the PKK, although this was unclear (necessarily, given the PKK's terrorist status at home) and thus sometimes queried by outsiders, or just allowed to remain ambivalent. 3 Compared to its predecessors HEP (1990 -1993 ), DEP (1993 -1994 ) and HADEP (1995 , which mainly operated during the heat of the conflict and were thus severely confined, DEHAP (2003 DEHAP ( -2005 and DTP (2005 DTP ( -2009 , working in a less tense political climate, were able to promote more concrete political programs that incorporated the (changing) goals of the PKK (see below).
The Kurdish political parties began to run an increasing number of municipal authorities in the South-East after the 1999 local elections, rising to as many as 54 municipality mayors across eleven provinces, and nine mayors of the provincial capitals by the end of the decade, while the DTP was represented in parliament by 21 MPs following the 2007 national election (elected as 'independent-candidates' in order to circumvent Turkey's 10% electoral threshold). It was through the DTP control of the region, especially of the municipalities, that the PKK was able to maintain and even extend its dominance and popularity there (Marcus, 2007b) .
The DTP can thus be regarded as putting into practice the new ideological project advocated
by Abdullah Öcalan, with many of its political representatives themselves former activists (or 'activists in office'), and pursuing the contentious politics of a (Kurdish/minority/human) rights based agenda (Watts, 2006) . Many authors have testified to how the lifting of the state of emergency in the South-East in the 2000s opened the way for a more self-conscious Kurdish associational life, and how the DTP run municipalities contributed to the emergence of a new Kurdish public sphere (e.g. Öktem, 2008; Marcus, 2007a and 2007b; Watts, 2006 Although continuing a process that had actually been initiated by the previous government, it
was the AKP that officially ended the state of emergency. Through this initial engagement with reforms, the AKP government managed to present itself as a party actively seeking to integrate different ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey and devoted to the 'democratization' of the country. This enabled the party during its first years in office to extend its electoral support amongst Turkey's Kurds, as well as gain favour amongst those within the EU institutions in favour of the country's accession.
As a result of the success of the AKP, particularly during its first administration, the DTP, like its predecessors, not only experienced continual political isolation inside Turkey (see Öktem, 2008) , and repeated demands that it distance itself from the 'terrorists' (PKK) -a call echoed in the EU-Turkey accession negotiations (see below) -but it has also found itself under pressure in its natural constituency. Electorally, the DTP found itself in competition with the AKP, and the PKK began treating what had become its main rival as its number one enemy (even above, that is, the Kemalist state military), with its media and leadership actively involved in efforts to discredit the ruling party (Uslu, 2008 motorcade that greeted the returnees, meanwhile, were perceived as provocative, appearing to the country at large as rather shocking images of PKK victory celebrations. Indeed, it was shortly after this incident that the DTP was banned, paying the price, many would argue, for a major strategic blunder, its own misreading of the other side and wasting of an opportunity (Jenkins 2009; Casier, Hilton and Jongerden, 2009 ).
To a certain extent the restriction of the AKP Kurdish initiative has been due to the small room for manoeuvre the government has. Its continued failure to really follow through with its professed aims, however, has fuelled cynicism about the initiative, as primarily dictated by electioneering politics. Certainly the AKP seems to have assumed the old economic analysis that has Kurdish discontent as originating from poverty and under-development rather than oppression and disenfranchisement. Through the resumption of the old GAP plans, a vast dam project for land irrigation and hydro-electric power, it seeks to tackle the economic grievances that are thought to underlie PKK support in the region and thus deny 'terrorism' its breeding ground. Given the general reluctance of the government to engage in any form of political dialogue and its recent reframing of the initiative as the ultimate struggle against 'terrorism', therefore, Turkey's Kurdish movement has increasingly felt driven into a corner (and all the more so with the closure of the DTP and ongoing raids and arrests of BDP members in the first half of 2010).
To conclude, both Turkey's Kurdish question and its main actor have evolved considerably over the last decades, not only since the beginning of the armed conflict in the mid-1980s but also since the PKK terrorist designation early in the millennium. In addition to its lengthy unilateral ceasefires and change of ideological tack from secession to federalism, the role played by the DTP/BDP in conventional politics has made it even more difficult to pin-down where the presence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Kurdish society really begins or ends, complicating its designation as 'terrorist'. At the same time, a competition has developed with the ruling AKP for the claim to represent Turkey's Kurdish population in the region, played out in the media and at the ballot box. This has given rise to a deepening animosity between the Kurdish nationalist movement and the current Turkish government, and forms the background against which the narrative of this paper should be understood. The PKK and its supporters have perceived themselves to be doubly confined, first by the international terrorist designation and second by the political challenges they face inside the region, and it is this particular combination of confinements that has informed the recent approach of the PKK to Turkey's EU application. Furthermore, it might be added, the current situation (i.e. in respect of the lack of progress or hope even of such from the AKP's Kurdish/democratic initiative)
indicates that the present dynamic will be a continuing one.
THE PKK PRESENCE IN EUROPE
The PKK 'struggle' did not remain confined to the Kurdish region of Turkey and its neighbours, but was continued on European soil, where the PKK established itself very early on in its history. Among the growing European Kurdish Diaspora, there developed a transnational Kurdish community which included the cross-border political organization of Kurds from Turkey (Grojean, 2008; Watts, 2004; Adamson, 2002; Östergaard-Nielsen, 2001 ;
Van Bruinessen, 1998).
The pro-PKK associations, set up since the mid 1980s proved helpful in obtaining public and political support among European Kurds, within a section of European public opinion and from a number of European politicians. Solidarity networks were built-up with small, extreme leftist organizations that were ideologically close to the PKK. Contacts were developed between leftist and Kurdish nationalist politicians holding seats in regional and national parliaments in different European countries as well as in the European Parliament (Casier, 2011) . This provided the PKK and its sympathizers with concrete means to advocate their cause and to publicize the plight of Kurds living in Turkey, particularly during the height of the armed conflict. PKK militants could collect financial contributions from European Kurds, call for hunger strikes and demonstrations, set up a satellite television station, radio stations and newspapers (Grojean, 2008; Watts, 2004; Eccarius-Kelly, 2002 ) and develop their own network of 'diplomats', all of which gave leverage to an increased visibility of their promotion of the Kurdish cause.
The tolerance of PKK activities and criticisms coming from European politicians enraged the Turkish authorities, whose embassies and diplomats were continually engaged in attempts to discredit the Kurdish organization (e.g. as funded by the narcotics trade and extortion from the European Kurdish populations). Turkey pressured the western European governments to crack down on PKK activities on their soil, threatening them in turn with withdrawal from economically important contracts and lucrative arm deals (Grojean, 2008) . This pressure gradually began to take effect, with increased governmental surveillance of PKK activities in a number of European countries. Although this was largely ineffective, it did pave the way for Europe's acceding to Turkey's request to list the PKK as an international terrorist organization.
THE LISTING OF THE PKK AS AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
The first country in Europe to list the PKK as a terrorist organization was the UK. With a thirty-year history of 'terrorism' in Ulster / Northern Ireland, the UK responded quickly to the changed environment following the 9/11 attacks in the US, and However, the extent to which the lists are necessary, really can be and actually are being used as leverage to pressure the different parties in the conflict is debatable. In Turkey's case, first, its desire to join the EU is already leverage in itself, with vastly more traction than anything the terrorist listing can provide; second, the existence of the lists certainly appears to have an opposite effect, i.e. to support those state actors that do not want to enter into negotiations for peace, but to proceed with a conventional counter insurgency approach against non-state combatants; and third, the listing has also undermined certain human rights in respect of the organizations listed, such as the freedom of expression and association.
On this point the EU action can be considered problematic. Turkey's problem with human rights has been one of the principle obstacles in its entry passage to Europe, and the Kurdish issue in the South-East the major part of this. And yet the EU seems not only to fall short of its own standards (the standard critique of Western anti-terror legislation taking on a sharp irony here), but also to have been guilty of a major disconnect in failing to appreciate that its terrorist designation would exacerbate the very human rights abuses it condemns. Thus, recent EU reports note concern about Ankara's 2006 amendments to its Anti-Terror law (EP, 2008) , leading to the entirely predictable conclusion of 'undue restrictions on fundamental human rights' (EC, 2009: 30) . 6 In the eyes of the PKK, the EU is culpable in this for its branding of the organization (see below), which the same reports only confirm when, for example, the European Parliament 'reiterates its solidarity with Turkey in its fight against terrorism and once again calls on the PKK to declare and respect an immediate and unconditional ceasefire' (EP 2008: 9) .
Obviously there is a need for the EU to confirm to Turkey that it can be a trusted partner that shows genuine concern for Turkey's internal and regional stability -Turkish sensitivities cannot just be ignored. This means that simple de-proscrition is not a realistic option. Most probably it needs to be linked to progress towards a negotiated resolution of the conflict, which would seem to mitigate for a deep involvement on the part of the EU in Turkey's 'peace process'.
Unfortunately, such a proactive approach by the EU has not been forthcoming. Instead, therefore, a one-sided policy has led the PKK's designation as a terrorist organization to become deeply ingrained in the accession negotiations. As a result, the main problems concerning the lack of willingness to reform on the Turkish side are linked to the ongoing and recently increased uncertainty about Turkey's entry into the European Union. The lack of anything like a complete commitment to Turkey by the EU means, therefore, that the effect of the designation remains questionable in this regard. It may well be that the PKK terrorist designation works against conflict resolution and thus exacerbates the human rights situation in the South-East which therefore continues to drag on Turkey's accession process leaving Turkey to 'sort out its own mess' before accession can even be countenanced -a prospect which, frankly, would not unduly worry many in Europe and, unfortunately, does appear to be the most likely scenario for the short to medium term future.
While practical anti-terrorism measures have affected the PKK and its militants and sympathizers to some extent, curtailing some activities, the de-legitimizing effect is crucial.
The labelling has had profound effects on the political and societal space for the Kurdish movement both in Turkey and in Europe -so much so that the majority of PKK initiatives undertaken at the diplomatic level have been to address the labelling and its consequences, rather than straightforwardly articulating grievances and demands and advocating for Kurds in Turkey.
FACED WITH THE TERRORIST DESIGNATION
Taking an agency-oriented perspective, which incorporates the ways in which actors present their problems and develop coalitions (Smith & Bakker, 2005) , the following sections engage with how the listing has been received inside the circles of PKK militants and sympathizers.
Having the actors 'speak for themselves' is not meant to provide a platform to proclaim and/or promote their aims and means, but allows a better understanding of these actors and their collective psychology that steers strategic choices being made. The response to the listing and an assessment of its effects are contextualized here in the relationship between the PKK and the EU institutions.
'European states are being taken hostage by Turkish Policies' -proscription as betrayal
The proscription of the PKK as a terrorist organization and the condemnations of terrorism in EU official communications have been perceived as a betrayal by the leading figures in the PKK and their followers. Engaging in an inquiry of this shared sense of betrayal is important in order to understand the anti-EU rhetoric of a number of leading figures within the PKK that has followed the terrorist listing (as described by Uslu, 2008) , and, at the same time, the continuation of the PKK's engagement with the European Union.
The feeling of betrayal relates strongly to both the timing of the first proscription and a 'politics of suffering'. Regarding the timing, the PKK was defined as a terrorist organization not only during a long period of (unilateral) cease-fire but also following Öcalan's scaling back of conditions for a solution to the Kurdish issue, as he openly argued that the problem in Turkey's south-east would be resolved by meeting cultural demands of the Kurds, thereby shifting the goal of political autonomy to the background. The ceasefire and scaled back demands were understood inside the movement and by its followers as a genuine display of 'The discourse on terrorism has been enormously damaging and it is the reason why the fact that DTP parliament members are sentenced to jail is not being discussed. […] The task for our European friends is to create opportunities for dialogue, and that is why it is necessary to put the concept of terror to discussion because now this is the wall that we are facing.'
A number of Kurdish activists, leading militants of the PKK in Europe especially, have come to see the EU as merely working in Turkey's interests and against that of the Kurds. Adem
Uzun, KNK Foreign Affairs member, reviewed the EU reports referred to thus: ' [I]n the post 9/11 period, taking courage from "the war against terror" and the "you are either with us, or against us" doctrine, Turkey escalated the war yet again.
[…] What we essentially would like to point out is that the EU's approach is prejudiced, more so, it regards the matter within the framework of the demands of the Turkish state. The charge against the EU of prejudice obviously needs shading -the EU is not a monolithic body with one single opinion. Support for the Kurdish cause in the Parliament comes mostly from the leftist parties, with centrist liberals also advocating for human rights (Casier 2011), but the parliament as a whole moved to the right at the last (2009) In direct contacts with EU politicians, however, it is the case that DTP/BDP representatives have been continuously asked to dissociate themselves from the PKK or to clarify their relationship. In a discussion with the then leader of the DTP group in the Turkish General Assembly (and current co-chair of the BDP), the DTP/BDP position on this was outlined in no uncertain terms:
'We are not going to consider the PKK a terrorist organization. We have to explain this in has been directed at the creation of a political space which is inclusive of the PKK, and thus devoted to the survival and strengthening of the position of the party and its leader (Casier 2011 
THE PKK IMPACT ON AND THE TURKEY-EU ACCESSION PROCESS
The PKK seeks both national and international recognition as the main representative of Turkey's Kurds. This quest is undoubtedly problematic in that it foregoes political and societal realities inside the country, where Kurds greatly differ in the extent to which they identify with their ethnicity, and how they relate their personal daily concerns to the political aspirations and promises of different political parties. Given that it swept the elections in the South-East during its early years in office, one could argue -and it has indeed been argued by Prime Minister Erdoğan himself -that the ruling AKP is the primary representative of the Kurds (Bahcheli & Sid, 2011) . However, even a majority in numbers is merely that: it does not undo the significant impact that the PKK as a social-political movement has in the region.
This impact translates into votes for the DTP/BDP, and the Kurdish constituents certainly do consider a vote for the pro-Kurdish parties to be 'voting PKK' (Marcus 2007b) .
Over the last two decades an alternative socio-political reality has come into being in the Kurdish dominated region of Turkey. It is unlikely that any 'Kurdish initiative' that neglects this reality or, for that matter, seeks to 'win back to society' the populace there will succeed in the short run. It is to be expected that huge numbers of politicized Kurdish citizens will continue to appoint the DTP/BDP and thus indirectly the PKK to speak on their behalf. A continued neglect of this reality, and/or active policies to hamper these political (and societal) actors through judicial short-winging and counter-terrorism, promises ongoing disengagement of this part of the Kurdish constituency from the Turkish state and society and increases Kurdish nationalist demands (see also Casier, Jongerden & Walker, forthcoming) . The apparent deepening of mass support for the DTP/BDP against the AKP and the hardening of the Kurdist position appear as evidence for this.
Obviously the ongoing refusal to enter into negotiations with the 'terrorists' (and ultimately a process of political integration) provides little incentives for the PKK to entirely abandon armed struggle as a resource. Therefore the armed campaign continues, even though it has become a low-intensity conflict in the post 1999 era. Indeed, Kurdish activist perceptions of the Kurdish opening as culminating in the closure of the DTP have already led, it would seem, to the suspension of the PKK ceasefire in the summer of 2010 and a 'a new era' of violence.
What form this new era may take is unclear, but there certainly seems to be a 'higher risk' in particular of PKK attacks on 'high profile, relatively soft, targets in the cities of western Turkey' (Jenkins 2010) -or, terrorism, by any standards.
The continued violence brings along new grievances on both sides, constantly reviving both Turkish and Kurdish nationalist feelings that then translate into further societal friction, including civil unrest and the outward discrimination of Kurdish citizens in Turkish cities (Yeğen, 2011; Kentel, 2011) . A destabilizing factor in Turkish politics, the continuation of the armed conflict thus raises serious internal (as well as cross-border) security issues. This is all the more so as the continuation of the conflict, and the anti-terror policies that accompany it, allow for undue restrictions in the spheres of the freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of organization and the freedom of political parties, and thus slows down the needed legal and judicial reforms in Turkey.
It is exactly these consequences that affect the Turkey-EU accession process, wherein
Turkey's human rights records and the process of democratization, demanding both political demilitarization and a depoliticization of the Turkish judiciary, have been continuous matters of concern for the member-states, the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament (see Tocci, 2005) . Indeed, the continued raising of these concerns is also what led (in the first half of the 2000s) to a number of accommodations of the Kurdish demands in Turkey that could never have been realized were it not for the bargaining space the EU provided the successive the Turkish governments. However, the ongoing atmosphere of 'being under threat' places serious obstacles in front of any government that wants to go ahead with the necessary reforms in the crucial domains of the judiciary and the military. A politically negotiated solution of the Kurdish issue, including the armed conflict is therefore intimately linked with the success or failure of the Turkey-EU accession process.
CONCLUSION
The designation of the PKK as an international terrorist organization has seriously affected the Kurdish nationalist movement and its supporters' trust in the international institutions, particularly the EU. This has brought some scholars, notably Uslu (2008) , to the reasonable conclusion that the PKK has turned against Turkey's accession to the European Union.
Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this paper suggests a different interpretation of the PKK position, that the criticisms and the diminishing support for accession amongst the Kurdish constituents be understood first, in the context of the position in Turkey -with the competition from the AKP -and second, in the context of the PKK proscription as a terrorist organization and the associated pressure brought to bear on the politically successful DTP.
With this in mind the strong anti-EU rhetoric of the PKK can be seen as one part of its ongoing struggle to (re)gain political legitimacy and create a political space that is inclusive of the movement that represents Turkey's most politicized Kurds.
The coming months and years will therefore be decisive for the PKK as it chooses whether or not to continue to support or opt out of the Turkey-EU accession negotiations. The thrust of this paper is to suggest that this is certainly not yet decided; the PKK has not renounced its support of Turkey's accession to the European Union, but rather has come to make its support conditional upon its own recognition as a political actor in the negotiations in particular, and Turkey's politics more generally. If the EU continues to list the PKK as a terrorist group and pressure the pro-Kurdish party in Turkey (now BDP) on its PKK relationship, then those (historically dominant) forces in Turkey that prefer to neglect Kurdish political representation will be further strengthened. Politically ignored and no longer militarily able to fight a guerrilla war, the PKK may indeed feel pushed towards full blown terrorism. The terrorist listing may become a self fulfilling category for another generation to deal with.
